The Labour leadership contest of 2015 resulted in the election of the veteran Leftwing backbencher, Jeremy Corbyn, who clearly defeated the early favourite, Andy Burnham. Yet Corbyn enjoyed very little support among Labour MPs, and his victory plunged the PLP into turmoil, particularly as he was widely viewed as incapable of leading the Party to victory in the 2020 general election. Given that much of the established academic literature on Party leadership contests emphasises the ability to foster unity, and thereby render a party electable, as two of the key criteria for electing a new leader, coupled with overall competence, important questions are raised about how and why the Labour Party chose someone to lead them who clearly does not meet these criteria. We will argue that while these are the natural priorities of MPs when electing a new leader, in Corbyn's case, much of the extraparliamentary Labour Party was more concerned about ideological conviction and purity of principles, regardless of how far these diverged from public opinion. This was especially true of those who signed-up to the Labour Party following the 2015 general election defeat. Indeed, many of these only did so after Corbyn had become a candidate. This clearly suggests a serious tension between maximising intra-party democracy and ensuring the electability of the parliamentary party itself. 
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The disjuncture between the preferences of the PLP and the extra-parliamentary Labour Party was most recently (and vividly) Indeed, many of these new recruits only signed-up once Corbyn had declared his candidature.
Moreover, many of these extra-parliamentary new recruits who supported Corbyn had not even voted for Labour in the 2015 general election. For the second time in five years, the PLP found itself being led by a Left-wing leader whose support originated almost entirely from outside the PLP.
The purpose of this article is thus to explain how Jeremy Corbyn was elected as Labour Party leader in September 2015 , from where and whom his support emanated, and why he attracted this support. In so doing, we will highlight the divergence between the criteria usually adopted by Labour parliamentarians when electing a new leader, and the qualities sought by much of the extra-parliamentary membership. Whereas the established academic literature emphasises the importance of party unity, electability and policy competence as the three key criteria for leadership candidates, we argue that these are the attributes usually (and understandably) prioritised by MPs themselves.
By contrast, as Corbyn's election highlights, extra-parliamentary members, and particularly a party's rank-and-file activists, are much more likely to be motivated by other considerations in determining who would be a 'good' party leader, and consequently prioritise different criteria, most notably ideological stance and concomitant commitment to core principles and 4 policies. Of course, this runs the serious risk that they will vote for a leadership candidate who is neither supported by the Party's MPs, nor popular among voters in general, thus rendering the party virtually unelectable: ideologically pure, but politically impotent.
When Labour MPs chose their leader
Until 1980, the Labour leader was elected exclusively by the Party's MPs. Prospective leadership candidates had to declare themselves at the outset and a series of eliminative (and secret) ballots would then follow until one of them achieved an overall majority. The rationale for this system was twofold. First, it was simple and efficient, in that it would yield a decisive result in a short period of time. Second, it was seen as imperative that the leader Wilson and Anthony Greenwood respectively and was comfortably re-elected on each occasion.
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The next three contests involved three or more candidates, but each was effectively a twohorse race between 'left' and 'right'. Even discounting the challenges of 1960 and 1961 -both won with predictable ease by the incumbent -contests held under this system were not especially competitive, but by 1980 had become progressively more so, the winner's vote share in the final ballot being lower in 1955, 1963, 1976 and 1980 than that of his predecessor. After 1935, Labour leaders held the position for long periods and were seldom forced to seek re-election. In 1976 , Henry Drucker (1976 noted that 'Once Labour elects a Leader, it is noticeably reluctant to remove him'. This reluctance has been explained with reference to the Party's 'ethos' (Drucker, 1979) and/or leader-eviction rules. High nomination barriers,
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and the requirement to challenge an incumbent directly, have made Labour leaders, once elected, relatively secure (Quinn, 2005) . When a vacancy did arise, the 'favourite' and early front-runner almost always went on to win (Drucker, 1976 (Drucker, , 1981 Stark, 1996; Heppell, 2010a; Heppell et al, 2010; Heppell and Crines, 2011) .
In 1968, Gunnar Sjoblom (1968) identified three strategic goals for parties operating in parliamentary systems: to remain united, win elections and implement policies. Adopting this framework, Stark (1996: 125) argues that, during a leadership contest, these goals are translated into criteria by which all candidates are assessed, a party's principal aim being to choose a leader who will maintain (or restore) party unity. Hence, 'acceptability' to all major party factions is the first-order criterion, yet 'only in extraordinary circumstances' does the unity goal become an explicit consideration. One example of this, Stark argues, occurred in 1980, when the veteran left-winger, Michael Foot, defeated Denis Healey. That Foot was considered the candidate who could best unite the Party 'spoke volumes' about the situation in which Labour found itself at the time (Stark, 1996 : 128. See also, Drucker, 1981 Heppell and Crines, 2011) .
More often than not, however, candidates for the party leadership are judged by their perceived ability to win a General Election and lead a successful administration. Hence, 'electability' is the second-order criterion and 'competence' the third. In 1963, Wilson was seen as superior to his two opponents, Brown and Callaghan, on all three criteria. In 1976,
Callaghan was chosen to succeed Wilson, again on all three counts (Stark, 1996; Drucker, 1976; Heppell, 2010a; Heppell et al, 2010) . Of the five contests held between 1983 and 2010, three (1983, 1992 and 2010) followed the incumbent's resignation and one (1994) his death. Only one (1988) was a challenge to the incumbent; as in 1960 and 1961, it failed. The original nomination threshold for candidates was subsequently raised to 20 per cent of the PLP, for challenges and vacancies alike. This presented problems in 1992, when Bryan Gould struggled to win sufficient nominations, and the rule was changed again in 1993. The threshold for challenges remained at 20 per cent, but for contests arising from vacancies, candidates now required nominations from only 12.5 per cent of the PLP, making it easier (in theory) for more contestants to stand (Quinn, 2004: 338-39) . The most controversial feature of the Electoral College as initially configured was the role of the trade unions, whose concentration of block votes could firmly establish a candidate as a 'front-runner'. The new system increased the power of union leaders and officials and led to claims that they were 'king-makers' (Quinn, 2004: 340 beholden to a backward-looking, change-resistant, sectional interest, and out-of-touch with the ambitions and aspirations of many voters in a post-industrial society (Wring, 2007: 81-82 .
See also Minkin, 1992 , 678. Weir, 1992 .
The National Executive Committee (NEC) established a review into the operation of the Electoral College, and duly recommended a new procedure, whereby the PLP, CLPs and affiliated bodies would each receive an equal (one-third) share of the vote (Alderman and Carter, 1994; Webb, 1995 In theory, these changes would significantly reduce the power of union leaders and officials.
The need for candidates to secure the votes of individual Party members and union levypayers meant that the media -especially television -would play an increasingly important 9 role. In a recalibration of the Electoral College's initial configuration, the vote of an individual MP or MEP was now worth the same as that of several hundred CLP members or several thousand union levy-payers, thus returning primary importance in future contests to the PLP, in terms of its 'gate-keeping' powers over nominations and its ability to shape the contest as a whole. Despite this, a candidate who trailed another in respect of backing from the PLP 'could still triumph' once Party members' and/or union levy-payers' votes were aggregated and counted (Quinn, 2004, p. 345 (1983, 1994 and 2010) , there were three or more. (Stark, 1996; Drucker, 1984; Carter, 1993, 1995) . In 2010, David Miliband was seen, according to the opinion polls, as the strongest candidate in terms of 'electability' and 'competence', but was clearly not 'acceptable' to the leaders of the three largest trade unions (Dorey and Denham, 2011; Jobson and Wickham-Jones, 2011; Pemberton and Wickham-Jones, 2013) . Of the two, Ed ultimately proved to be (marginally) more 'acceptable' to the Electoral College as a whole.
Constant controversy over Ed Miliband's election
From the moment his election as Labour Party leader was announced, Ed Miliband faced relentless criticism, and thus struggled both to establish his authority over the PLP and win the respect of the British public. Two of the most trenchant criticisms levelled against him concerned his decision to stand as a candidate in the first place, and the source of much of his support.
With regard to his decision to put himself forward as a candidate, and thereby compete against his brother David, Ed Miliband was variously accused of selfishly and ruthlessly placing his own leadership ambitions above those of his brother, and in so doing, grievously damaging the Labour Party's chances of electoral recovery: here at least, blood did not run thicker than water. Many such critics were convinced that David Miliband was the candidate most likely to 'reconnect' the Party with voters, and thereby restore its credibility and popularity before the 2015 general election. As such, Ed Miliband was subsequently condemned for effectively denying his brother the Labour leadership, and in so doing, deeply damaging the Party's chances of electoral recovery.
However, there was a second substantive criticism of Ed Miliband's victory, namely that it had largely accrued from the trade union votes in Labour's tripartite Electoral College, particularly those unions representing public sector workers (Bagehot, 2010; Oakeshott, Woolf and Watts, 2010) . While this provided a constant source of political ammunition for the Conservatives and their press allies to attack Miliband with throughout his leadership (see, for example : Martin, 2014; Martin, 2015; Ross, 2013) , it also ensured that when he criticised the Coalition Government's public sector reforms and cutbacks, this was invariably cited as evidence that he was merely acting on behalf of his (public sector) trade union supporters and paymasters. This criticism also implied that in the highly unlikely that Ed
Miliband became Prime Minister, his alleged subservience to public sector trade unions would prevent him from taking decisions in the national interest, especially when cuts in public expenditure were required
These two problems were compounded by the media's merciless mocking both of Ed
Miliband's appearance -the cruel [Wallace and] Gromit comparisons -and his repeated failure to communicate effectively to voters via his speeches, some of which sounded as if they had been written by policy wonks, and which therefore reinforced a widespread public perception that Ed Miliband and his entourage were out-of-touch with ordinary people: part of an insular North London liberal elite. By contrast, although there was no great public love for the Conservatives, David Cameron did at least appear to be articulate, assured, and most important of all, 'Prime Ministerial'. He inspired a calm confidence and credibility which Ed
Miliband could never remotely convey.
Reforming Labour's Electoral College
Sensitive to the repeated allegation that he had won the Party However, there was another more specific impetus for this review, namely an acrimonious and well-publicised dispute over the selection of Labour's prospective parliamentary candidate in Falkirk, in 2013. In this instance, it was alleged that the Unite trade union had sought to 'rig' the ballot to ensure that its preferred candidate was adopted, whereupon an argument ensued between Unite and senior Labour Party figures at national-level -which was naturally given prominence by pro-Conservative newspapers (Chapman, 2014; Patel 2013) . Although an internal inquiry into the episode subsequently exonerated Unite of any malpractice, Miliband clearly felt that the well-publicised episode had reminded voters of the close links between the Labour Party and the trade unions, and the sometimes embarrassing role of the latter in the Party's candidate selection process, and ultimately, Labour's leadership contests. He thus announced an immediate review into Labour's candidate selection procedures, and in particular, the role played by -and inter alia, the Party's relationship withthe trade unions (Miliband, 2013) .
Chaired by Lord (Ray) Collins, the review resulted in a radical report being published in The 'affiliated supporters' would be those who belonged to organisations which were themselves affiliated to the Labour Party, such as trade unions, but rather than being automatically eligible to vote in Labour leadership contests by virtue of paying the political levy via their trade union, they would need to register -at no extra cost -to become 'affiliated supporters', whereupon they would acquire the right vote in Labour leadership contests (Collins, 2014: 23) .
The third category, that of 'registered supporter', had been proposed in an earlier reviewRefounding Labour -of the Party's extra-parliamentary organisational structure and modus operandi. In particular, this had examined ways in which the Labour Party could both give existing members a more constructive and meaningful role at local level, and how it could reestablish itself more extensively and firmly in local communities. One method for achieving the latter objective was to create a category of 'registered supporter' of the Labour Party, which would entail payment of a nominal fee, accompanied by a formal declaration that they fully supported the Party's values. It was envisaged that 'registered supporters' would often be 'people in their local community who back Labour, but are not members of the party' (Labour Party, 2011: 15 (Collins, 2014: 27) , a slight increase from the erstwhile 12.5% requirement, but somewhat less than the 20% initially favoured by Ed
Miliband (Wintour, 2014) .
There was no change, however, to the electoral system used for the leadership contest itself, namely the Alternative Vote. As such, Labour's full members, affiliated members and registered supporters would each be required to rank the candidates in order of preference. If any candidate received more than 50% of the first-preference votes, they would win outright, but if this target was not attained after the first preferences had been tallied, the candidate who received the fewest first-preference votes would be eliminated, whereupon the secondpreference declared by their supporters would be distributed to the remaining candidates: a method of election once derided by Winston Churchill as entailing 'the most worthless votes given for the most worthless candidates' (Hansard, 1931: Vol.253, col,106) . This process would be repeated until one of the candidates had amassed more than 50% of the overall votes.
The candidates step forward -and occasionally back again
When leadership elections immediately follow a major electoral defeat, they are almost inevitably a de facto inquest into why the Party lost. After all, the policy platform which each candidate campaigns on will reflect their conclusions about why the policies recently offered were evidently unpopular, or lacked credibility, with the voters who had recently shunned the Party at the polls, and thus why a new tranche of policies was urgently needed. In Labour's 2010 leadership contest, the Party, its candidates and their supporters had clearly been divided in their interpretation of why that year's general election had been lost; some thought that it was because the New Labour 'project' had run its course, and could no longer solve Britain's economic and social problems, while others were convinced that Gordon Brown had not adhered sufficiently closely to the New Labour 'ethos', having diluted it when he succeeded Tony Blair as Prime Minister (see, for example: Abbot, 2010: 5-7; Balls, 2010; Blair, 2010; 680-61; Burnham, 2010; Mandelson, 2010; Miliband, D, 2010; Miliband, E, 2010) .
In 2015, however, there was an apparent consensus among many of the initial leadership contenders that Labour's surprisingly heavy defeat was largely due to Ed Miliband having pulled the Party too far to the Left since 2010 (Pickard, 2015) . This is not to deny that some individual policies and positions were quite popular (such as a proposed 'mansion tax' whose revenues could yield extra funds for the NHS, a higher minimum wage, and partial renationalisation of the railways -but there was also a concern (apparently shared by many voters) that Miliband's Labour Party lacked an overall vision or 'narrative' about what it stood for overall. Perhaps more damagingly, approval of these ostensibly Left-wing policies was countered by a widespread perception that Labour was hostile to big business and wealth creators, and had nothing to offer aspirational working-class and middle-class voters for whom the sundry speeches passionately denouncing inequality, poverty, predatory capitalism and zero-hours contracts failed to strike a chord (see, for example, Bond, 2015; Yvette Cooper, quoted in BBC, 2015a; Feeney, 2015) . Labour was apparently on the side of those 'left behind' or struggling, rather than those who wanted to 'get ahead' or were prospering.
This perspective was trenchantly articulated, just a couple of days after the general election result, by one of the first Labour MPs to declare his candidature, Chuka Umunna. His analysis of Labour's crushing election defeat was that:
We spoke to our core voters but not to aspirational, middle-class ones. We talked about the bottom and top of society, about the minimum wage and zero-hour contracts, about mansions...But we had too little to say to the majority of people in the middle.
We allowed the impression to arise that we were not on the side of those who are doing well. We talked a lot -quite rightly -about the need to address (Hope, 2015a) .
Certainly, the initial front-runner was Andy Burnham, not just in terms of having attracted the most nominations among Labour MPs, but also because sundry opinion polls deemed him to be the most popular or credible candidate both among Labour voters and, crucially, the public (electorate) in general. This was illustrated by an Ipsos-MORI poll which was conducted immediately after the close of nominations, when the four contenders were finally declared, as illustrated in Figure 1 . Twitter campaign '#ToriesForCorbyn'. One prominent Conservative commentator who heeded this advice was Toby Young, who confessed that he was motivated by a desire to 'consign Labour to electoral oblivion' (Young, 2015a; Young, 2015b) .
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However, the Conservatives' view of Corbyn as an atavistic throwback to the Bennite Left of the 1980s was shared by many of his critics in the Labour Party itself, particularly the Blairites. In their eyes, Corbyn was good at appealing to Left-wing activists and bien pensants always looking for an oppressed group or right-on cause to campaign for, but would pose absolutely no electoral threat to the Conservatives; indeed, would effectively guarantee the Conservatives' victory in the 2020 general election, and quite possibly consign the Labour Party to Opposition for a generation, if not in perpetuity (Blair, 2015a; Blair, 2015b; Johnson, 2015; Mandelson, 2015) .
However, for some of Corbyn's opponents in the Labour Party, it was not so much
Conservative infiltration which was a problem, but the likelihood of the hard-Left mobilising to vote for Corbyn. One (anonymous) Labour source alleged that not only was Corbyn 'sneaking in Green Party members by the back door', but that a mass influx of new Party members or professed supporters, whose sole objective was to secure Corbyn's victory, would be 'completely illegitimate and on a par [with], if not worse than, the Militant infiltration in the 80s' (quoted in Wintour and Perraudin, 2015) .
In the context of such allegations and concerns, there were calls from some Labour MPs and Party allies for the leadership contest to be halted, in order to check how many of those who had recently 'joined' the Party as affiliated or registered supporters were genuine, rather than being members of rival parties or organisations hostile to Labour, and whose applications were thus mischievous or malicious (Hope, 2015b : Lyons, 2015 Walker, 2015; Whitaker, 2015) . Such calls however, were firmly rejected, it being insisted that applications were already subject to robust checks, although it was not made clear precisely how such care and diligence was actually ensured.
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Corbyn the conqueror (1): Where did Corbyn's support emanate from?
When the result was announced on 12 September, the scale of Corbyn's support was such that he won outright, without the need to distribute the second-preference votes of those who voted for Kendall, as illustrated in Table 4 . share of the vote among Party members was fractionally less than half, at 49.58% (compared to the 84% share he enjoyed among 'registered' supporters).
Impressive though such a vote share undoubtedly was in a contest with four candidates, it does suggest that support for Corbyn was slightly more cautious or qualified among fullypaid-up Labour Party members than the other two categories of members or supporters. affiliated supporters than registered supporters, turnout was much higher in the latter category than the former -93% to 48.5% -and it was among the latter that support for Corbyn was strongest: almost 84% of them voted for him, compared to just under 58% of affiliated supporters and fractionally fewer than half of full members (BBC, 2015b) .
Meanwhile, the YouGov survey also revealed that support for Corbyn was somewhat higher among the younger members of Labour's 2015 electorate, as shown in Figure 3 . Whereas 64
and 67 per cent of the 18-24 and 25-39 age cohorts respectively supported Corbyn, barely half of the 60+ cohort did so. One other notable finding from this YouGov survey concerned the way that Labour's affiliated and registered supporters had voted in the recent general election. As Figure 4 shows, 'only' 60 per cent of the latter had actually voted Labour, whereas almost a quarter had opted for the Green Party, and five per cent of them had supported the Liberal Democrats. that of any of the main parties', with many of these supporters being those who feel 'left behind' in an era of rapid socio-economic change and globalisation (Ford and Goodwin, 2014: 153, 154) .
Corbyn the conqueror (2): Why did Corbyn receive so much support?
It seemed rather ironic that a candidate who could not be described as flamboyant or a particularly notable orator -he often seemed quietly-spoken and rather unassumingnonetheless attracted such adulation from many people, particularly among the young, who had previously become (or had already been) disillusioned with mainstream party politics, and always 'on-message' identikit party leaders. Yet for his supporters, in an age of vacuous celebrities and obsession with image, Corbyn's apparent 'ordinariness' was actually a large part of his appeal; they viewed it as 'authenticity', and thus evidence that he was not part of the 'Westminster bubble' which was itself contributing significantly to the public's increasing 30 loss of faith or trust in established (and 'Establishment') political elites. Of course, there was a certain irony in the fact that the enthusiasm which Corbyn inspired among many of his supporters, and the high turn-out at his public meetings, transformed him into something of a celebrity himself, albeit a reluctant one.
Yet Corbyn's election as Labour leader seems incongruous in the context of Stark's three criteria for electing party leaders which we outlined earlier, particularly the importance of fostering party unity as a pre-requisite of rendering a party electorally credible, and inter alia promoting an image of leadership competence. This disjuncture is evident in Figure 5 , which illustrates the personal qualities or political strengths which each candidate's supporters attributed to them. (Kellner, 2015: 39) -and alarmed at the Party's consistently poll ratings, and its continued lack of economic or political credibility among voters (Helm, 2015; Helm, 2016; Kellner/YouGov, 2015; Rawnsley, 2016; Savage, 2015; Wilkinson and Hughes, 2016) .
Conclusion
It was ironic that the 2014 abolition of Labour's Electoral College, primarily to reduce the formal, but often controversial, role of the trade unions in the Party's leadership contests, entailed creating new categories of voters, most notably that of 'registered supporter'. While this constituted an understandable attempt at boosting Labour's mass membership, and 'connecting' with people who had not previously involved themselves with the Party, it also meant that these members would be able to play a major role in choosing the next Labour leader, even if they had only been registered for a few weeks, or even just a few days. There was no stipulated minimum length of membership or registered support before they became eligible to vote, and as such, Jeremy Corbyn attracted much of his support both from Labour supporters who had only registered since the general election defeat (albeit in some cases, 33 before Corbyn's candidature had been confirmed), and 'full' members who had similarly joined the Party only after the crushing May defeat.
Labour MPs were naturally aghast that a perennially rebellious Left-wing, CND-supporting, backbench rebel, with no Ministerial experience in his 32 years as an MP, and who was as likely to be found joining, or even addressing, a public rally or protest, as he was sitting on the green benches in the Commons, was elected as Labour leader, largely as a consequence of votes cast by 10,000s of individuals who had not even been members or registered supporters of the Party for more than a few weeks. Indeed, some of them had voted for other parties in the May 2015 election, most notably the Greens and the Liberal Democrats.
From the outset, therefore, Corbyn struggled to establish his authority and legitimacy as Party leader, for the overwhelming majority of Labour MPs had never wanted him as leader, or even considered him to be a credible contender in the first place, and strongly disagreed with his radical Left-wing views. Even some of those Labour MPs who nominated Corbyn and initially welcomed his election subsequently confessed that 'we have come to regret that decision' (Cox and Coyle, 2016) . 
